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The Zapad-2017 exercises: the information war (for now) 
Andrzej Wilk 
The Russian-Belarusian Zapad-2017 (West-2017) exercises, scheduled for 14–20 September, 
have for many months been the core of an information war between Russia and NATO, 
in which Ukraine and Belarus have also participated. The media have presented these exer-
cises as allegedly the biggest military undertaking carried out in recent years by the armed 
forces of the Russian Federation (together with its Belarusian ally) in the immediate vicinity of 
the borders of NATO states, which could form the basis for the annexation of Belarus and/or 
a strike at Ukraine. And although it is hard to dispute the scale and breadth of these exercis-
es, they are only a small part of Russia’s preparation for a potential military showdown with 
NATO. The real engagement of troops in these exercises will not be the largest, in terms of 
the scale and the force employed, or the most important in the Russian army’s preparation 
to carry out its plans during wartime in (from its perspective) the western strategic direction. 
The training exercises reported in the media, which have mainly been carried out on Russian 
training grounds from May to August this year, have not been an essential element of these 
preparations in 2017. These exercises, held jointly with the Belarusian component (in oper-
ational terms the Belarusian army should be considered as an integral part of the Russian 
armed forces in the western strategic direction), were nominally merely a preparatory stage 
to the Zapad-2017 exercises. The exercises involving Russian troops alone should be consid-
ered as more important, especially those checking the combat readiness of the units which 
have been newly created or expanded in the last three years. Compared to the period in which 
the previous exercises (Zapad-2013) were held, Russia’s military potential in the western stra-
tegic direction, especially its land forces, has doubled in size.
Zapad-2017 as a tool of information war
Russia treats the Zapad strategic exercises, 
which have been held every four years since 
2009, as part of its information war with the 
West each time. However, whereas between 
2009 and 2013 the propaganda impact of the 
reports about the exercises was largely local, 
limited mainly to the three Baltic states and Po-
land, as a result of the Russian aggression to-
wards Ukraine and the three years and counting 
of war in the Donbas in 2017, it has now be-
come one of the main factors affecting the re-
lations of Russia with all the North Atlantic Alli-
ance, as well as those Baltic Sea states which do 
not belong to NATO. Since the beginning Russia 
has treated the preparations for the Zapad-2017 
exercises, on the one hand, as part of its intim-
idation of the general public in the countries 
directly bordering Belarus and Russia, through 
reports transmitted mainly through Belarusian 
or Ukrainian media. On the other hand, by 
gradually the deprecating reports about the 
scale and nature of the military threat (which 
have mainly been disseminated via Belarusian 
or Ukrainian media), it has been deepening the 
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divisions between the ‘new’ and ‘old’ members 
of the European Union, on a wave of alleged 
anti-Russian hysteria generated by the former. 
Most likely in response to the Russian propa-
ganda machine, the Zapad-2017 exercises have 
been used for the first time as an essential el-
ement in the information policy of NATO (and 
the United States), and also (in the regional 
dimension) by Ukraine. Unlike previous Zapad 
exercises, it is the message from Kiev which 
should currently be considered the most alarm-
ist, and (thanks to the tension in Russo-Amer-
ican relations) it is being legitimised to a great 
degree by the North Atlantic Alliance.
The Zapad-2017 exercises are the core of the 
information war between Russia and NATO 
which has been going on uninterrupted since 
November 2016, when the plans of the Russian 
Federation’s Defence Ministry regarding an in-
crease in military railway transports between 
Russia and Belarus in 2017 were disclosed. The 
number of 4162 cars contracted for the period 
from 1 January to 30 November 2017 (a figure 
several times larger than in previous years) was 
reported in the media as enabling a possible 
attack on Belarus by up to 30,000 soldiers, i.e. 
almost the entire Russian 1st Guards Tank Army. 
The consequence of this was a series of reports 
over the next few months stating that after the 
end of the exercises, the Russian group would 
remain in Belarus as occupation forces. Such re-
porting gained particular intensity in the first 
quarter of this year, when once again the gov-
ernment in Minsk simulated a more intense de-
sire for rapprochement with the West – a move 
which suggests that this also was an element 
of Belarus’s own information war. Then com-
ments appeared (particularly in the Ukrainian 
media) suggesting that the Russian soldiers 
transported to Belarus would be used to strike 
at Ukraine. It was only in August, on a wave of 
studies (emerging from Poland, among others) 
justifying the possibility of such a scenario, that 
Russia issued reports and figures indicating 
that the actual figure for the use of rolling stock 
in the Russian-Belarusian military exercises ap-
plied to the whole of the year 2017, and not just 
the Zapad-2017 exercises1. 
Russian representatives also began to sup-
ply data on the number of forces and vehicles 
planned for involvement in the exercises, in-
cluding 12,700 soldiers (7200 from Belarus and 
5500 from Russia, about 3000 of whom will be 
based in Belarus), 70 aircraft and helicopters, 
680 armoured fighting vehicles (including 250 
tanks), 200 artillery units (barrel, missile and 
mortar) and 10 ships2. These numbers are much 
lower than those cited in the previous media 
reports, especially those coming out of Ukraine. 
According to the National Security and Defence 
Council of Ukraine, the entire Zapad-2017 exer-
cises were to have included 230–240,000 sol-
diers, over 10,000 units of heavy weapons, 100 
aircraft and helicopters, and 40 ships3. Reports 
such as these should be considered as an at-
tempt to mobilise Western (particularly Ameri-
can) support for Ukraine (especially in the area 
of defence). 
1 See for example Владимир Сергеев, Эшелоны идут на 
«Запад-2017», http://belvpo.com/ru/8541.html
2 Комментарий Департамента информации и печати 
МИД России относительно соблюдения в подготовки 
ходе учениям к транспарентности мер «Запад-2017», 
http://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_pub-
lisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2845944. It is note-
worthy that previously – as the first to do so – the Rus-
sian defence ministry reported about 280 units of heavy 
weapons (combat vehicles and artillery) and 25 aircraft; 
we should assume that the data is consistent with the 
later report by the Russian foreign ministry, and that it 
applies only to the Russian army’s equipment which was 
planned for deployment in Belarus.
3 О. Турчинов: «Запад-2017»-реальність і загрози, 
http://www.rnbo.gov.ua/news/2858.html
The Zapad-2017 exercises are the core of 
the information war between Russia and 
NATO which has been going on uninter-
rupted since November 2016, when plans 
to increase military railway transports 
were disclosed.
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The official Russian data should be considered 
as being far closer to the real figures, although 
they have been deliberately reduced to less 
than 13,000 soldiers, the ceiling figure which 
would have required the implementation of 
confidence- and security-building measures, 
including the mechanisms for observation ex-
ercises provided for in the OSCE’s Vienna Docu-
ment. This has been backed up not only by the 
Russian army’s practice up to now, but above 
all by the conditions, starting with the capac-
ity of the training grounds designated for the 
exercises in Belarus (4 general military grounds 
and 2 for air training) and Russia (3 in the Kalin-
ingrad, Leningrad and Pskov oblasts). Neverthe-
less, the total number of forces and resources 
involved in the Russian and Russian-Belarusian 
training projects in the western strategic direc-
tion since spring 2017 may be up to ten times 
greater than those involved in the Zapad-2017 
exercises.
Russian training activity in the western 
strategic direction in 2017
The Zapad-2017 exercises are the culmination 
of a series of training projects carried out in the 
western strategic direction in 2017. From the 
perspective of Minsk, they will be the biggest 
military event since the Zapad-2013 exercises, 
although from the perspective of Moscow, 
Zapad-2017 is just another project involving the 
forces and vehicles of the Western Military Dis-
trict, which from the training perspective are 
neither the biggest nor the most important of 
their kind. Starting in spring this year, the train-
ing grounds in Belarus and the Western Military 
District of the RF have seen at least several doz-
en projects in the field of mobilisation and com-
bat readiness, redeployments, troop regroup-
ing and advances, tactical exercises on training 
grounds etc., involving formations of all types 
of troops and services, from a minimum of bat-
talion level up to and including division level. 
To better evaluate the scale of these projects, 
it should be noted that the training projects in 
the Zapad-2017 exercises will mostly be carried 
out at battalion level, up to brigade level.
In terms of the exercises to be carried out joint-
ly with the Belarusian army, special attention 
should be paid to the projects based on support 
and security for the general military formations, 
the scale of which exceeds the requirements to 
prepare the subunits for the Zapad-2017 exer-
cises. On 19–25 May, Belarus saw the largest 
ever exercises by electronic warfare units, which 
involved a total of 1500 soldiers from both ar-
mies. The logistical exercises carried out on 21– 
–25 August, one element of which was a securi-
ty operation for the pipelines supplying fuel to 
the frontline troops, should be seen in a similar 
light. These exercises proceeded on two diffe- 
rent tracks, one as a Russian-Belarusian project 
(2500 soldiers from both countries on the terri-
tory of Belarus) and the other as purely Russian 
(3000 soldiers on the territory of the Russian 
Federation, which also included interoperabil-
ity training in wartime with the transmission 
network operators). Of the projects preparing 
for Zapad-2017 carried out on the territory of 
Belarus, attention should also be paid to the 
training for engineering (13–15 June), commu-
nications (10–14 July), chemical defence (21–25 
August) and air defence formations, in which 
aircraft from bases in Russia were moved to Be-
larusian airfields (23–25 August).
The summer training period for various kinds 
of exercise (which started in June) included the 
majority of the units in the Russian Federation’s 
Western Military District; this means that the 
From Moscow’s perspective, Zapad-2017 
is just another project involving the forces 
and vehicles of the Western Military Dis-
trict, which from the training perspective 
are neither the biggest nor the most im-
portant of their kind.
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formations comprising units for the Zapad-2017 
exercises have effectively been in a state of per-
manent training. This principally concerns the 
Airborne Troops; the Baltic Fleet, together with 
its subordinate air-land grouping in the Kalin-
ingrad oblast; and the 1st Guards Tank Army. It 
is also worth noting the two bilateral regimen-
tal exercises (in July, the 98th Airborne Division 
from Ivanov, with the participation of the 31st 
Air Assault Brigade from Ulyanovsk, at the train-
ing ground near Pskov; and in August, the 76th 
Air Assault Division from Pskov, with the partici-
pation of the above-mentioned 31st LAB and the 
45th Spetsnaz Brigade), in both cases involving 
2500 soldiers, at least 300 units of heavy weap-
ons and several dozen planes and helicopters. 
During the Zapad-2017 exercises we can ex-
pect a much lower involvement of the airborne 
troops, at the level of tactical battalion groups. 
Of the projects for the 11th Army Corps in the 
Kaliningrad oblast, attention should be paid 
to the brigade exercises of the 336th Naval In-
fantry Brigade from Baltiysk (in June) and the 
regimental exercises of the 7th Mechanised Reg-
iment from Kaliningrad (in August), as well as 
the exercises by the 244th Artillery Brigade and 
the 25th Missile Brigade (nominally a coastal 
defence unit, armed with Bastion systems ca-
pable of destroying ground targets with Kali-
br missiles). It must be stressed, however, that 
most of the maritime, land and air units which 
have been deployed in Kaliningrad have been 
training since June, and the 11th Army Corps 
has already held exercises four times (including 
twice in August). The units of the 1st Guards 
Tank Army, especially its two main tactical for-
mations, the 2nd ‘Tamanskaya’ Mechanised Di-
vision and the 4th ‘Kantemirovskaya’ Armoured 
Division, should also be regarded as active. The 
tank crews of the 4th AD have also undergone 
some exercises in Belarus, conducted in mid-
June. The most important elements of the 1st 
Guards Tank Army’s training, however, took 
place in August: checking the combat readiness 
of the tactical formations and the support and 
security units of the 1st Army (achieving com-
bat readiness and preparation for deployment, 
15 August) as well as the new automated com-
mand and control system (from 28 August). 
Probably the largest tactical exercise carried out 
in 2017 in the Western Military District involved 
not the units assigned to participate in the Za-
pad-2017 exercises, but rather the mechanised 
divisions formed as part of the newly created 
20th Army – the 3rd and the 144th MDs. On 14– 
–18 August, a bilateral exercise was carried out 
at the training ground in the Voronezh oblast, 
including both the above-mentioned tactical 
formations (the participating units simulat-
ed a clash of opposing forces), in which 2000 
soldiers and 600 units of heavy weapons took 
part. In the training projects which will make 
up the Zapad-2017 exercises, we should not ex-
pect any simulated clashes between formations 
of more than 1000 soldiers. In addition to those 
mentioned, we should note what will probably 
turn out to be the biggest Russian air defence 
exercises this year, which were carried out in 
the Western Military District at the beginning of 
July (5000 soldiers and 2000 units of arms and 
military equipment, including 100 aircraft and 
helicopters), as well as exercises by the Railway 
Troops in building crossings (on 1 August, they 
constructed a bridge 400 m in length across 
the Oka River; and on 24 August, a 1-km-long 
bridge on the Volga; for comparison, the cross-
ing built on the Dnieper by engineering units in 
the context of the exercises in Belarus was 300 
m in length).
The most important elements of the 1st 
Guards Tank Army’s training, however, took 
place in August, checking the combat read-
iness of the combat units, as well as the new 
automated command system.
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The growth of Russia’s military poten-
tial in the western strategic direction
In the period between the Zapad-2013 and 
Zapad-2017 exercises, the Russian groupings 
in the western strategic direction changed di-
ametrically. In all types of troops and servic-
es, the potential for growth has mainly been 
achieved through extensive large-scale tech-
nical modernisation, although in the case of 
the Land Forces, and to an extent the Airborne 
Troops, the most important factor was the 
formation of new units and the expansion of 
those already existing. It is noteworthy that the 
Western Military District is hosting most of the 
tactical formations which have been newly cre-
ated in recent years, and those created in the 
other military districts have also been deployed 
in the western strategic direction (in the Rostov 
oblast, as part of the Southern Military District) 
or just beyond the Urals as part of the sec-
ond strategic echelon in the western direction 
(in the Central Military District). Meanwhile, 
no new tactical formations have been created 
in the Russian Far East.
During the period in question, two new army 
headquarters have been created (the 1st Guards 
Tank Army in Moscow and the 8th Army in Novo- 
cherkassk), as well as three army corps (the 11th 
in Kaliningrad, the 14th on the Kola peninsula, 
and the 32nd in Crimea). The 8th Army and the 
32nd Corps (both directed towards Ukraine) 
have received most of the newly created units. 
New divisions have also been deployed in the 
20th Army (Voronezh). In total, between 2015 
and 2017 four new divisions have been creat-
ed (three mechanised: the 3rd, 144th and 150th 
MDs in the western strategic direction, in the 
Western and Southern Military Districts; and 
one armoured: the 90th AD in the Central Mil-
itary District). The Russian army’s tactical for-
mations are being systematically expanded up 
to wartime status; the newly-created divisions 
each have four regiments of combat potential 
which are comparable to brigades (which have 
the same structures and sizes of general mili-
tary subunits), and additional regiments have 
also been created in the previously existing 
2nd MD and 4th AD of the 1st Guards Tank Army. 
The creation of new military formations has 
been accompanied by the formation of bri-
gades and regiments to provide support and 
security at army level.
The nature and structure of the airborne troops 
have also been changed; at present they are 
de facto mechanised formations with increased 
capacity for rapid redeployment, with a de-
structive force comparable to the classic mech-
anised formations (especially after the divisions 
and brigades of air assault tank companies, 
and ultimately of tank battalions, are included). 
The newly created reconnaissance brigades, 
which combine various elements including elec-
tronic surveillance, should be associated with 
the western military direction (so far only the 
Eastern Military District has not received any 
such units). As of June this year, thirty battal-
ion and company tactical groups from Western 
Military District units had the status of immedi-
ate response forces. Fifteen of them have also 
received the status of so-called shock subunits.
The technical modernisation of the western 
strategic direction is proceeding at a rate com-
parable with that observed in the other stra-
tegic directions, although the process is dis-
tinct from those others in several ways. Units 
in European Russia have been the main recip-
ients of new command and communications 
systems and electronic warfare equipment, 
as well as Ratnik personal equipment for the 
The Western Military District is hosting 
most of the military formations which 
have been newly created, and those cre-
ated in the other military districts have 
also been deployed in the western strate-
gic direction.
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‘soldier of the future’; they are also the first to 
have received the elements of the integrated 
command structure, together with equipment 
for tactical data exchange for ranks up to and 
including private (with the Ratnik equipment). 
The western strategic direction is also getting 
the majority of the new or modernised arms of 
the Land Forces (including T-72B3 tanks, which 
since their upgrade now have the same battle 
potential as T-90 tanks), as well as Su-34 bat-
tlefield support aircraft (frontline bombers) and 
Mi-28 attack helicopters.
As of mid-2017, the proportion of new and 
modernised weaponry in units in the Western 
Military District was 45%; therefore, we should 
see the rate of modernisation observed as guar-
anteeing that the planned ceiling of 70% will 
be achieved by 2020. In the first half of 2017 
the Western Military District received 500 units 
of offensive heavy weapons4, and another 500 
units should reach those groupings in the sec-
ond half of the year.
We should assume that the Western Military 
District will be the first recipient of the new 
generations of weapons, including T-14 tanks 
on the Armata platform (the Armed Forces of 
the Russian Federation have ordered 100 tanks 
of this type, to be delivered by 2020; at pres-
ent one test company has been equipped with 
sixteen T-14 tanks) and Su-57 fifth-generation 
multi-role combat aircraft (T-50 PAK FA). 
It is noteworthy that the rearmament of units 
in the Kaliningrad region is proceeding at rela-
4 According to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces 
in Europe (CFE), tanks, combat armoured vehicles, artil-
lery guns of 100-mm calibre and above, combat aircraft 
and combat helicopters.
tively the slowest pace in the western strategic 
direction. On the one hand this can be seen as 
a political demonstration (for example, the re-
armament of the 152nd Missile Brigade with the 
Iskander system is still being treated as an ele-
ment of gameplay with the United States, i.e. 
as a ‘response’ to the deployment in Poland of 
elements of the American missile defence sys-
tem); on the other, it represents a rational as-
sessment of the military situation in the region 
(increasing the range of destructive weaponry, 
mainly by introducing Kalibr rockets, allows the 
Russian army to achieve any aim it wishes in 
the area of Central Europe without the need to 
use the infrastructure in the Kaliningrad region, 
which is potentially the most vulnerable to de-
struction by the local forces of NATO states).
Conclusions
Russia’s use of the Zapad-2017 exercises as the 
starting point for a military operation – the oc-
cupation of Belarus, a strike at Ukraine or even 
blocking the Suwalki Gap (which the exercises’ 
political scenario, disclosed on 29 August, might 
suggest5), and the possible amputation of the 
three Baltic states from the rest of the NATO 
area – should be considered as extremely un-
likely. Undertaking such an action, along the 
model of 2008 (the attack on Georgia after the 
Kavkaz-2008 exercises), would mean that Mos-
cow had acknowledged as essential the military 
necessity to counter the actual (or even formal) 
integration of Ukraine with Western structures, 
or the presence of the US military in that country 
(or in the Baltic states to any significant degree). 
Carrying out such an operation would be ac-
5 The report by the Russia Deputy Defence Minister, Alek-
sandr Fomin, deserves attention for its reference to the 
participation in Zapad-2017 by units of the FSB and the 
National Guard, which hitherto had been standard prac-
tice only in internal Russian exercises. The participation 
of groups from outside the Defence Ministry confirms 
that the exercises also include scenarios for possible 
pacification (occupation) after the attack by operating 
forces, and that the National Guard is preparing for 
tasks which in Soviet times had been performed by the 
troops of the NKVD.
The Western strategic direction has also 
been getting the majority of the new or 
modernised arms of the Land Forces, 
as well as battlefield support aircraft and 
attack helicopters.
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Changes in the numbers of expanded general military operational formations, tactical forma-
tions and units of the Land Forces of the Russian Federation in the western strategic direction 
between 2013–2017 (as of mid-2017)
  2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Armies 2 2 2 3 4
Corps - - - 2 3
Divisions 2 2 2 3 5
Brigades/regiments6 6/7 6/7 7/7 9/13 7/21
6 In the armoured and mechanised brigades and regiments of the Land Forces of the Russian Federation, the number and 
structure of the general military subunits (mechanised battalions or tank battalions) is identical.
APPENDIX
companied by non-military measures: in the first 
place, a massive information campaign to discred-
it the potential enemy, which as a result would 
justify the use of military force – at least to the 
Russian public. On the other hand, the condition 
for such an operation would have to be Moscow’s 
relative certainty that there would be no real 
combat response from the Western states and 
structures (especially the US and NATO). It should 
be assumed that in the present situation, the 
above-mentioned conditions for Russia to launch 
another military operation have not been met.
However, Russia’s actions in the military sphere 
over recent years indicate that its preparations 
for a possible armed conflict in Europe are being 
carried out consistently, and are permanent in 
nature. The armed forces of the Russian Feder-
ation have reached a level of ability that would 
allow the relatively smooth implementation of 
any military operation in the area of the for-
mer Soviet Union (albeit in the case of the three 
Baltic states, only upon the assumption of the 
effective disinterest of the US, which currently 
must be considered unlikely). It remains unclear 
whether Russia could implement its policy objec-
tives by military means, which would in reality 
need Moscow to use its military factor. It must 
be assumed that, in the case of a maintenance of 
the status quo – i.e. the lack of any greater mil-
itary support from NATO for Ukraine (of a kind 
which would actually influence the growth of 
the Ukrainian army’s potential), or the Alliance’s 
constant, significant military presence in the Bal-
tic States – Russia would disregard the direct use 
of military force to implement its policy objec-
tives at least until the end of the football World 
Cup, which it will host in June and July 2018; this 
event is treated in Moscow as a matter of high 
prestige. However, we should not expect the 
Russian Federation to cease or even limit its use 
of the military factor as a tool of its information 
war with the West.
